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 COMMUNISM AT 
BIRKBECK 
 Steven Shaviro 
 Conference Review: “On the Idea 
of Communism,” Birkbeck 
College, 13–15 March 2009 
 The conference “On the Idea of 
Communism” took place at Birk-
beck College, in the University of 
London, on 13–15 March 2009. 
There were twelve speakers, and 
nearly a thousand people in atten-
dance. The conference, which was 
organized by Slavoj Žižek and Alain 
Badiou, was intended, as Žižek said 
in his opening remarks, not to 
engage in discussion of actual polit-
ical programs, or to intervene in the 
harsh realities of day-by-day social 
and political struggles, but to con-
sider how the philosophical idea, 
or ideal, of communism might be 
revitalized and made useful in the 
twenty-fi rst century. Žižek said that 
the time for guilt over the crimes of 
the twentieth century was over, 
and that today we need to reclaim 
the name of “communism” from 
the ill repute into which it has 
sunk. For my part, I think that this 
impulse is altogether correct. Many 
crimes were undoubtedly commit-
ted by Communist parties, or in the 
name of communism, throughout 
the twentieth century. But capital-
ism, too, is guilty of many crimes. 
And where communism has been 
thoroughly demonized, capitalism 
still refuses to acknowledge its own 
crimes or to show any repentance 
for them. Given the increasingly 
untenable situation in which we 
live today, exacerbated by the cur-
rent fi nancial disaster, communism 
may well be an idea whose time 
has fi nally come. 
 Of course, part of the appeal of 
events such as this conference is 
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simply that they give us an oppor-
tunity to see academic superstars in 
action. From this perspective, “On 
the Idea of Communism” did not 
disappoint. Slavoj Žižek was in fi ne 
form, manic and excited, and so 
full of a kind of outward-directed 
energy that I didn’t really mind his 
overbearingness. Gianni Vattimo, 
whom I had never seen before (and 
of whose works I have read only a 
little) was quite a charmer, in a 
humorously self-deprecating way. 
Terry Eagleton reveled in the role 
of the lone British commonsense 
empiricist in a room otherwise full 
of Continental dialecticians. Anto-
nio Negri was warm and animated, 
while Jacques Rancière was admi-
rably meditative. Alain Badiou 
served as a sort of éminence grise, 
dominating the proceedings as a 
central reference point even when 
he wasn’t on stage. 
 The main question that the con-
ference raised for me was not “What 
is communism?” nor even “How 
can theory be tied to practice?” but 
rather “What does it mean to ex-
plore the mere idea of communism, 
as opposed to the actuality of capi-
talism?” The idea of communism 
is to a large extent a negative one in 
that we don’t really know what a 
communist society would be like; 
we can only say that it would mean 
the emancipation of people, and 
the establishment of forms of life 
that are repressed, oppressed, and 
denied an opportunity to fl ourish 
today. Terry Eagleton’s talk was the 
only one that endeavored to give 
anything like a positive sense of 
what communism might be like, 
that tried to imagine it as an actual 
state of being rather than just as 
the negation of what we have 
today. For Eagleton, communism 
means abundance and leisure; it is 
much closer to the life of aristocrats 
(or, rather, to our imagination of 
aristocrats’ lives) than it is to any-
thing like the oppressive actuality 
of working-class experience. He 
explained this sense of actual com-
munism by quoting copiously from 
Shakespeare and other great ca-
nonical authors. The unintended 
effect of this “blast from the past” 
was to suggest, in a symptomatic 
way, the limitations of any attempts 
to imagine utopia. It didn’t really 
convince. I appreciated Eagleton’s 
citations of  The Tempest in the same 
way that I appreciated other speak-
ers’ invocations of Plato and Hegel, 
but, all in all, Eagleton seemed to 
me to be a bit too vague and too 
fussily “literary,” in an old-fashioned 
way; he spoke a bit too much as 
though it were still the “good old 
days,” when horrible things like 
movies and TV and the Internet 
didn’t yet exist. 
 Eagleton’s talk, together with 
the complete lack of speculation as 
to what communism might actu-
ally entail by the other speakers, 
left me convinced that “the idea of 
communism”—or what Alain Ba-
diou, both in his own talk and in 
writings cited by others at the 
conference calls “the communist 
hypothesis”—is a utopian ideal, even 
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in the old-fashioned sense of the 
nineteenth-century “utopian social-
ism” that Marx rejected and mocked. 
At the very least, “communism” is 
the name for the only sort of uto-
pianism available today that does 
not involve any religious or New 
Age ideas of perfectibility, redemp-
tion, and salvation. For commu-
nism is rather something much 
more down to earth. Communism 
has to do, pragmatically as well as 
etymologically, with a sense of “the 
common,” as Michael Hardt ar-
gued in his impressive talk on the 
fi rst day of the conference. In 
Hardt’s view, the “common” is op-
posed both to private property and 
to the state property of twentieth-
century “actually existing socialism.” 
The common is neither “public” nor 
“private,” but rejects both sides of 
this binary opposition. The com-
mon rather has to do with the fact 
that individual creativity is itself 
possible only in the context of all 
the linguistic, cultural, scientifi c, 
and technological heritage of hu-
mankind. As Newton famously 
said, he was only able to see further 
than others because he stood on the 
shoulders of giants. Today, more 
and more of our common heritage 
is being privatized, copyrighted, 
and patented by multinational cor-
porations. Political struggle must 
involve taking back what is com-
mon to all of us. From this pers-
pective, communism doesn’t mean 
giving up on our inner lives, but 
creating an environment in which 
such lives might fl ourish. And, in 
this humane sense, the idea of 
communism is not really a politi-
cal notion, although politics is un-
doubtedly a large part of what 
might be needed to get there. 
 Hardt’s discussion of commu-
nism and the common involved a 
focus on political economy and on 
the question of property. Hardt’s 
frequent collaborator Antonio Ne-
gri had this emphasis, as well. But 
one of the things that surprised me 
the most overall about the confer-
ence was that so few of the other 
speakers had anything to say about 
what Marx called “the critique of 
political economy”—or, for that 
matter, about the current economic 
crisis (whose menace is certainly 
part of the reason that “the idea of 
communism” has become think-
able again or that so many people 
attended a conference like this). 
Now, I suppose that part of the 
reason for this avoidance of politi-
cal economy is that the very point 
of “the idea of communism” is to 
imagine a society in which the cur-
rent constraints of a capitalist politi-
cal economy no longer apply. But 
this isn’t much of an alibi when you 
consider that so many of the talks 
at the conference were, indeed, about 
the political strategies that might 
be used to get there from here. 
 For instance, Peter Hallward, 
with his usual lucidity and philo-
sophical precision, developed a 
rather alarming call for Jacobin 
rigor and discipline in the defense 
of virtue. He expounded upon, ex-
plicated, and expanded Rousseau’s 
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doctrine of the “general will.” How-
ever, Hallward failed to explain 
why such a reversion to the eigh-
teenth century might provide reso-
lutions to the questions of political 
organization that Marxists strug-
gled with, and failed to resolve, for 
much of the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries. He also failed to 
consider how revolutionary orga-
nizations analogous to the Jacobin 
clubs in 1790s France could arise in 
the fi rst place in the contemporary 
world. Cut off from any pragmatic 
application, Hallward’s invocation 
of a politics of the will struck me as 
little more than a fantasmatic return 
to the bad old days of “party disci-
pline” that any left-wing movement 
today would better do without. 
 At the other extreme from 
Hallward, a number of speakers—
most notably, Badiou and Judith 
Balso—went on at great length 
about the necessity of struggles 
against the State; but they seemed 
to do this with little sense of how 
State apparatuses actually work to 
support and reinforce capital and 
fi nance. The dirty little secret of 
neoliberalism is that the “free mar-
ket” could not actually function if 
the government were actually to 
observe a policy of laissez-faire and 
to leave “the market” alone. For it 
is only by rigid State control over 
things like the money supply, to-
gether with rigid enforcement of 
“property” laws (based on the absurd 
fi ction that, say, the genetic makeup 
of genetically modifi ed crops some-
how had the same inviolable status 
as my personal effects in my bed-
room), that the crazed fi nancial 
speculation of the last several de-
cades could have happened in the 
fi rst place. It is disheartening to 
hear people on the left denounce 
the State in the very same terms 
that the neoliberals hypocritically 
and misleadingly do. 
 The problem I have with leftist 
anti-State rhetoric was most use-
fully brought out by Bruno Bosteels, 
who pointed out how distinctly 
unhelpful such an attitude is when 
we have a situation such as that in 
Bolivia, where President Morales 
is specifi cally using the power of 
the State—as a result of his election 
to offi ce by a large majority—to 
improve economic conditions for 
the vast masses, even at the expense 
of the wealthy and privileged. One 
might add that, in Bolivia as re-
cently in Thailand and several 
other places, it is precisely the priv-
ileged bourgeoisie who have used 
the tactics of anti-State “people 
power,” with mass protests and civil 
disobedience, to bring down dem-
ocratically elected majority gov-
ernments who threatened their 
economically based privileges. 
 The problems that arise from an 
avoidance of any “critique of po-
litical economy” were particularly 
evident in the case of Alain Badi-
ou’s talk. Not only did Badiou leave 
out political economy from his de-
scriptions of how the revolutionary 
event might challenge the capital-
ist status quo; but also, when ques-
tioned on this score, he explicitly 
 ON “ON THE IDEA OF COMMUNISM” CONFERENCE 151
denounced any attention to politi-
cal economy as being the sin of 
“economism.” Badiou argued that 
economics could only be part of 
“the situation” that it is the busi-
ness of a new “truth,” produced in 
a revolutionary event and by fi del-
ity to that event, to disrupt. Badiou 
shows his Maoist pedigree in this 
insistence on politics as the ulti-
mate ruling instance. Instead of 
engaging in the critique of political 
economy, and seeing the political 
as so intimately intertwined with 
the economic as to make any sepa-
ration of them impossible, Badiou 
relegates economy, in a nearly 
Gnostic sort of way, to the realm of 
the irretrievably fallen. His notion 
of a pure politics (and a pure phi-
losophy) unsullied by any contact 
with, or “contamination” by, the 
economic, is really the mirror im-
age of today’s neoclassical econom-
ics that imagines itself to be value 
neutral and apolitical. What this 
comes down to is that Badiou is a 
Maoist without the Marxism—a 
stance that I fi nd rather terrifying. 
 At his best, Badiou is a kind of 
neo-Kantian. This is an appella-
tion that he would undoubtedly 
reject, and one that most contem-
porary philosophers would fi nd 
damning, though I mean it as a 
sort of praise. What I mean by Ba-
diou’s neo-Kantianism is that his 
whole notion of the transformative 
event, and of the ethics of remain-
ing loyal to the event, is something 
like a late-modernist version of the 
categorical imperative. The event 
is singular and yet of absolutely 
universal import—it commands 
our obedience, regardless of our 
merely personal, “pathological” in-
clinations. Badiou even defi nes the 
event, and the way we are called to 
be faithful to it, in entirely  formalist 
terms—we are commanded by the 
very form of the event rather than 
by anything having to do with its 
specifi c content. This is an utterly 
Kantian way of thinking—and, un-
like so many Hegelian commenta-
tors, I fi nd this empty formalism 
to be a strength, rather than a 
weakness, of Kantian ethics. But I 
shudder when Badiou goes on to 
denature this Kantian impersonal 
universalism by turning it into a 
Pauline or Leninist or Maoist form 
of what Kant would have called fa-
naticism. Again, I am no Leninist 
or Maoist to begin with, but to take 
Leninism and Maoism and remove 
the Marxism from them, as Badiou 
does, really leaves us with nothing 
but a delusional hyperevoluntion-
aryism and a romanticized revel-
ing in the cleansing possibilities of 
terror. 
 All in all, the conference show-
cased the two major strains of 
European and North American 
theoretical approaches to commu-
nism today. On the one hand, there 
is the return to revolutionary fer-
vor advocated by Žižek and Ba-
diou. On the other hand, there is 
Hardt and Negri’s vision of the 
“multitude” as a force against “em-
pire.” Žižek and Badiou insist upon 
the need for a “radical voluntarism” 
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to oppose the otherwise ubiquitous 
reign of capital. Hardt and Negri, 
to the contrary, see late capitalist 
globalization as, in effect, already 
creating the objective conditions 
for communism. The difference 
between these two visions echoes 
the dispute, which ran through 
all of twentieth-century Marxism, 
between vanguardists who sought 
for strategies to take power and 
those who believed that the logic of 
history would almost automati-
cally lead from capitalism to social-
ism and then communism. In the 
twenty-fi rst century, this opposi-
tion has become so sterile that we 
need somehow to get beyond it al-
together. But this is something that 
nobody at the conference was able 
to offer. 
 In a conference so dominated by 
European and North American 
concerns, the rest of the world was 
noticeable by its absence. All the 
speakers were white Europeans 
or North Americans; in addition, 
eleven of the twelve speakers were 
men. The audience was more gen-
der balanced than the panels, but it 
was also overwhelmingly white. 
This narrowness was quite deplor-
able. Žižek is well known for his 
criticism of what he sees as mul-
ticultural pieties in the Anglo-
American academy, but, in this 
case, I would not allow him to get 
away with the claim that worries 
about the overwhelmingly white 
and male composition of the panels 
is just some irrelevant whining 
about representation. Rather, the 
composition of the conference be-
speaks a parochialism that “we” in 
the West have still only done a very 
poor job of breaking away from. 
Bruno Bosteels was the only one of 
the twelve speakers who talked a bit 
about contemporary Latin Ameri-
can (specifi cally Bolivian) experi-
ences and theorizations of getting 
beyond capitalism. The Chinese 
Cultural Revolution was the ex-
plicit focus of Alessandro Russo’s 
talk, and a number of other speak-
ers referred to it. But, all in all, the 
conference was far less internation-
alist than it ought to have been. 
 Žižek, speaking on the last day, 
gave what I am sure he would be 
happy for us to think of as a Hege-
lian synthesis of everything that 
went on during the conference. 
Unlike most of his colleagues, and 
in what might be thought of as a 
nod to Hardt and Negri, his analy-
sis did include political economy. 
He listed four threats or challenges 
that we face today in our world of 
capitalism gone mad, and three of 
them, he acknowledged, fi t under 
the rubric of Hardt and Negri’s 
notion of “affective” or “immate-
rial” production. These were (1) the 
threat of environmental disaster; 
(2) questions of so-called intellec-
tual property, of copyright, patents, 
etc., and of the privatization of the 
common (understanding this in 
the broadest sense, as Hardt ar-
gued); and (3) questions of bioengi-
neering, genetics, and the ability 
to manipulate our own genes and 
thus change “human nature” on a 
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biological and physiological level. 
Žižek added to these another chal-
lenge, which he said underlay all 
the others: (4) the question of in-
clusion and exclusion on a global 
level—as refl ected in border con-
trols, nationalisms, and the ques-
tion of immigration (the countries 
of the North excluding people 
from the Global South, except in-
sofar as their hyperexploitation 
was facilitated on the basis of ad-
mitting them with only a semilegal 
or illegal status). This last concern 
ties in with the whole question of 
 global slums , as recently raised by 
Mike Davis. It also articulates the 
demands of capital that lie behind 
what Gilles Deleuze called the 
control society. And, fi nally, it gives 
a way of acknowledging the issues 
raised by postcolonial theory with-
out falling into the multicultural-
ism that Žižek is not altogether 
without justifi cation in criticizing. 
 Žižek argued that these questions 
could be resolved, in an anticapi-
talist direction, only by maintain-
ing principles of egalitarianism and 
universalism. His example of this 
was the Haitian Revolution as the 
radicalization, or Hegelian com-
pletion, of the French Revolution. 
The French tried to repress the Hai-
tians, which means that the French 
were not able to live up to their 
own universalism—they wouldn’t 
apply this to black people. But the 
Haitians took the principles of the 
French Revolution more seriously 
than the French themselves did; they 
demanded and won independence, 
against the French, on the basis of 
the very principles that the French 
had fi rst enunciated. This is Žižek’s 
way of splitting the difference be-
tween his inherent Eurocentrism 
and the fact that by his own prin-
ciples of universality he needs to 
get away from Eurocentrism. In 
effect, he is privileging Europe on 
the grounds that Europe invented 
the very universalism that comm-
ands us to stop privileging Europe. 
As so often, I remain highly dubi-
ous of how this kind of Hegelian 
maneuver can be invoked any time 
Žižek needs to get out of a tight spot. 
It ends up being, to my mind, a little 
too easy and self-congratulatory a 
method of resolving the problem. 
 In any case, after laying all this 
out, Žižek went on to talk about 
some of the diffi culties that we face 
in trying to deal with these ques-
tions. He was emphatic in arguing 
that the radicalness of communism 
needs to be upheld against the sort 
of reforms that—now that some 
of the excesses of fi nance are being 
at least slightly reined in—could 
come under the name of socialism 
(as in  Newsweek ’s recent assertion 
that “we are all socialists now”). 
Such socialist reforms (including the 
nationalization of institutions like 
banks, or the de facto ownership of 
the majority of stock in troubled 
fi nancial corporations by the U.S. 
government) would give an illu-
sion of reform while really leaving 
the massive inequalities (between 
wealthy fi nanciers and everyone 
else, and even more between the 
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citizens of Western nations and 
the overwhelming majority every-
where else in the world) largely 
untouched. I think that Žižek is 
right about this—the current crisis 
situation at least in principle makes 
radical alternatives more thinkable 
than they were during the Inter-
net and real-estate bubbles—even 
though the recuperative efforts of 
Western governments today are al-
most entirely oriented toward keep-
ing alive the sense that there is no 
alternative, even as the system (ne-
oliberal capitalism) to which there 
is supposedly no alternative has col-
lapsed and discredited itself. 
 In this light, Žižek talked of the 
diffi culty of making any transgres-
sive or oppositional gestures today 
because of the way that such 
gestures almost immediately get 
commodifi ed and recuperated, and 
because the very ideas of transgres-
sion and radical innovation have 
themselves become capitalist re-
sources, the mantras of every busi-
ness school and every CEO. Žižek 
even quoted Brian Massumi to this 
effect, much to my surprise (since 
Massumi, like Hardt and Negri, 
is very much on the Deleuzian side, 
rather than the Lacanian one, of 
recent debates). 
 Awareness of these issues, I 
think, prevents Žižek from articu-
lating groundless fantasies of revo-
lutionary agency in the way that 
speakers like Hallward and Badiou 
did. Yet the only solution Žižek 
himself had to offer, in his talk, was 
an appeal to Badiou’s transcendental 
formulation of politics as fi delity 
to an event of radical rupture and 
of “communism” as the name of 
this event or rupture. During his 
talk, Žižek called several times for 
a “radical voluntarism”—though, 
when called on this formulation in 
the Q&A, he backpedaled (at least 
rhetorically) and said that all he 
meant by such a term was that, un-
like the old Marxists of the earlier 
part of the past century, we could 
no longer believe today that the 
logic of history was on our side or 
that we could trust to the objective 
course of events to displace capital-
ism and create the necessary and suf-
fi cient conditions for communism. 
 I agree with Žižek on this—
indeed, my largest disagreement 
with Hardt and Negri is precisely 
that they seem to affi rm a soft ver-
sion of the inevitable-movement-
of-history or “objective conditions” 
thesis—but I think that a term like 
“radical voluntarism” works to in-
sinuate a positive thesis—a sense of 
“what is to be done?”—that simply 
isn’t there. Which leaves us back in 
our current condition: the demor-
alization of an impotent Left. I 
have no solution for this dilemma—
and I don’t think Žižek and Ba-
diou (or Hardt and Negri either) 
have any more of a solution than I 
have. The problem is that these 
theorists are way too eager to adopt 
the rhetoric of seeming as though 
they do. 
 All this was symbolized, sadly, 
at the very end of the conference. 
As everyone was preparing to leave, 
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Žižek asked us to all stand up and 
sing the “Internationale.” Almost 
nobody did—a few people in one 
corner were singing it but couldn’t 
be heard above the general hubbub. 
In my case—and I suspect this held 
for a large majority of the hundreds 
of people in the auditorium—I 
would have liked to sing the “Inter-
nationale,” but I couldn’t—because, 
although I am vaguely familiar 
with the melody, I do not know the 
words. 
 —Wayne State University 
